Human Factors

Human factors and human errors are two separate things but are often used interchangeable in conversations and in the aviation industry. Human errors are attached to a person who could be linked to an occurrence. In addition, the severity of the outcome is a predetermining factor how important it is to assign human error as the root cause after an accident. 

Human error root cause analysis has widespread support from the aviation industry. However, with the implementation of the Safety Management System (SMS) regulations, accountability came into play, and it became impossible to justify human error as the root cause. 

A healthy SMS looks at the organization and its systems, and the fact that a person overlooked, or missed an item is no longer a root cause, such as a pilot missing a checklist item. Checklists are required and are used for any flight, but there is no evidence a missed checklist item was the root cause of any accidents. At the other end of the spectrum, completing the gear-down checklist item was a contributing factor to a fatal accident in 1972. A descent went undetected when the flight crew became focused on a checklist item. 

Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system or an organization. On the other hand, human error is also a symptom of a successful organization. There are organizations where human errors are integrated with the system and need to be there for the organization to exist and prosper. It is the system itself that is set up for human errors.  

Conventional wisdom is that human error is a” bad” thing when using emotions to describe an event.  Human error is a sub-category of human factors. Simplified, human factors are how a person react when one or more of the five senses, vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are triggered. Human factors are also how external forces, or events, e.g., fatigue, weather, illumination and more, affect performance. 

In an organization where there are overwhelming events of human errors, the organization operates within a system that is prone to these errors. An example is Daytona 500, or Reno Air Races, where the systems (race to win) are setting each driver and pilot up for human error, or a crash. Both the Daytona 500 and Reno Air Race organizers have requirements and systems in place to reduce harm to drivers, pilots, or spectators, but these systems are designed for human errors. Imagine how successful Daytona 500 would be if the speed was limited to 50MPH, or if the Reno Air Race required airplanes to fly between gates separated a mile apart. 

Civil aviation industry systems are not set up as systems where human errors are desirable, but occurrences still happens because aviation operational systems allow for it. Civil aviation systems are not as obvious as the racing-systems to promote human errors, but they both happens because of human and organizational factors, and to get the job done before closing time. 

The aviation industry struggles with the human error concept. This struggle affects their organizational environment, and a trap to fall into is to make pilot, or human errors the root cause. However, the safety management system requires operators to look inward into the organizational systems to repair or replace one or more systems. If a process is stable and undesirable, but not broke, the process should not be fixed. The old saying that “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” holds true in aviation safety. A stable, or desirable process may from time to tome turn out faulty items and mistakes. Reacting to these mistakes is tampering with the process contributing to an increase in future errors. Tampering with a stable process moves the process closer to a point to become a contributing factor to accidents.

  
Several years ago, a pilot and three passengers went on a mountain flight with a PA-28-140. The aircraft was full of fuel and above max gross weight at takeoff. As often, when there are no other adverse conditions, the flight departed safely, and slowly climbed into the valley towards the taller mountains.

 
While the winds were relatively calm at the airport, on this day the winds were extremely strong in the mountains. One pilot had earlier that day refused to take the scenic flight because of the mountain winds, but another pilot accepted. 

The pilot banked and turned for the passengers to see the beauty of the mountains. Before the pilot could react, the aircraft stalled and crashed. A close friend found them later the next day in a highly remote area.

Human and organizational factors are often linked together in the text but are two separate factors. Human factors are how human reacts to inputs, while organizational factors are the result, or output, of these reactions. The term organizational factors encompass all elements that influence the way that an organization, and everybody within it, behave. Some of these elements are formal management systems, assurance processes, working practices, whether or not formally documented, risk awareness, how the organization learns from experience, organizational safety culture and more.

 
A safety policy is directed at human factors. Safety for an airport or airline is to maintain the confidence of the travelling public and safety of the aviation industry is vital to success. Through the introduction of a safety management system, an airport is committing to provide a systemic, explicit, and comprehensive process for managing airside safety risks. By embracing this safety management system, airports establish safety as an integral part of an airport culture where they recognize that safety is paramount.

Human factors is a scientific study that evaluates and comprehend human interactions and human behaviors in relation to other human and elements of a workplace system. The human factors five senses reactive or proactive affect human behavior and performance. These senses are vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. 

The SHELL model is a model of human factors interactions and includes the software(S), hardware(H), environment(E), liveware, other(L), liveware, self(L). 

Software are regulations, standards, policies, job descriptions, expectations, and other intangible items. Hardware are the physical and tangible items housing intangible items. Hardware are electronic devices, documents, tools, airfield, and other tangible items. 

The environment has multiple sub-categories. A sub-category of the environment is the designed environment. A design environment is user friendly environment, design and layout, accessibility, tasks-flow, and more. The social environment is about distancing, both physical contact between persons and distancing between equipment and objects, experiences, culture, language and more. 

The climate is another sub-category of the environment. Climate environment includes geo location, weather, temperature, and more. Amy these human factors has an affect human behavior in one way or another. 

When one or more of the human senses are targeted by inputs, or when interactions between the elements of the SHELL model are incompatible, the effect on human reaction, or process output, are commonly known as human errors, or pilot errors.

Human errors are not errors, but reactions to the operational SHELL model system, and human senses are reactions they are exposed to by the system itself.    

 
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