Perimeters vs. Parameters

By Didrik Strand offroadpilots@gmail.com
Perimeters are directives, while Parameters are challenges. Both perimeters and parameters have their operational place in any organization with perimeter being task oriented and parameters are result oriented.

The perimeters are established to stay within confined area. 
Operational perimeters are evaluated to the limits of the perimeters. The issues are for tasks to be performed within the box, without deviation to venture outside the box. As long as all tasks are performed within the perimeters of the box, performance is acceptable.  This limits initiatives and operational decisions to assigned specific tasks. Tasks within the box may be applied in initial learning situations to instil knowledge and behaviour patterns, or to ensure regulatory compliance. This could be explained as when a person first learn to fly an airplane, the pilot-student has to stay within the box of assigned tasks to learn the aircraft's behaviour, and to understand the limits of operational regulatory compliance. As long as all operations are within the limits of the box, or perimeters, life is good.

Operational parameters are job-performance evaluation of results achieved. The limits are not lateral, as with perimeters, but limited to levels of complexity with initiatives and accountability. Parameters are result oriented, where one parameter must be completed before moving onto the next. Operational parameters requires skills, training and knowledgeable personnel. Assigned parameters are effective in  just-culture organizations, where results, or outcome of processes are evaluated.  

The parameters are established for results.
The difference between process parameters and process perimeters, is that process parameters tasks are linked and connected by individual activates,  while process perimeters tasks are individually independent and disconnected. An example of process perimeter could be the assembly line, where one robot has a specific independent task,  while an example of process parameter could be resilience to operational abnormalities.

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