Where Birds Don't Fly

When the Safety Management System was first implemented one of the reasons was to keep the Regulator away from interfering with operations of both airlines and airports. It worked well in the beginning, but after a while the Regulator reverted to Pre-SMS to micromanage safety compliance rather than regulatory compliance. This is best described in the Regulator’s own words saying “To be direct, [the Department] has a number of concerns surrounding [Your Amazing Airport / Airline], not only from a regulatory perspective...”   You are in charge to the degree you can keep the glass ½ empty. There is a great danger to aviation safety when the Regulator believe they comprehend your operations better than you do yourself. In addition, the Regulatory has turned away from a Safety Management System in their own words, by being the rule-maker, enforcer and judge. Again, this can best be described in their own words. “Our role at [the Department] is to monitor for regulatory compliance which can

Aviation came to a standstill when COVID-19 virus spread globally. Airplanes are parked, taking up space on runways and taxiways that before was used for landing, takeoff and taxiing. Every airport is an aviation ghost town. Every airplane is a liability to safety. A liability to safety is a hazard where the parked airplanes become a higher risk to aviation than when they were flying. The COVID-19 is a special cause variation, as opposed to a common cause variation in an SPC control chart. A special cause variation requires a root-cause analysis with a Corrective Action Plan. A CAP requires data to establish factual causes, or the merit of the case itself. There is no such data available, only computer models, which are based on opinions and not facts of what the future holds.  COVID-09 are aeronautical obstructions globally. Last time the world stopped flying was in 2001. Since then aviation globally has operated normally. Applying data from normal operations when conducting a root-ca